Courts have traditionally placed the regulation of foreign affairs within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. Recently, twenty-three cities and one state have challenged the exclusivity of this jurisdiction by enacting selective purchasing laws that prohibit local governments from conducting business with companies that "do business" with the Union of Myanmar ("Myanmar'} 1 Most notable of these laws is the Massachusetts Burma Law ("Burma Law'~. Considering the constitutionality of such selective purchasing laws for the first time, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in National Foreign Trade Council v. Bakerl correctly held that the Burma Law "unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs." 4 However, by failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law had "more than an incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,'' 5 the court missed an opportunity to clarify when state regulation becomes unconstitutional involvement in foreign affairs.
On June 25, 1996, the Massachusetts General Assembly enacted legislation prohibiting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its agents "from purchasing goods or services from anyone doing business with [Myanmar] ." 6 The Burma Law authorized the Operational Services Division (OSD)1 to establish a "restricted purchase list," which contained the names of companies that met the statutory definition of "doing business with Burma." 8 Once a company's name appeared on the restricted purchase list, the Commonwealth could purchase goods from that company only in limited circumstances. 9 The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) 10 sought a declaratory judgment that the Burma Law was unconstitutional, arguing that the law "intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to regulate foreign affairs," "is preempted by a federal statute and an executive order imposing sanctions on Myanmar," and violates the Foreign Commerce Clause by discriminating against and burdening international trade. 11
Chief Judge Tauro struck down the Burma Law as an infringement of the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs.12 He applied the test :for foreign affairs regulation established in Zschernig v. Miller, 13 which he interpreted as requiring state laws that affect "significant issues of foreign policy" to be voided. 14 Finding such an effect, Chief Judge Tauro held that the Burma Law did not pass the Zschernig test and was therefore unconstitutional. 15
By failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law had "more than an incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries," 16 the court missed a crucial opportunity to clarify current jurisprudence regarding state involvement in foreign affairs. Although Zschernig es-9 These circumstances included instances when the procurement was essential and the restriction would have eliminated the only bid or would have given rise to inadequate competition; for example, when the state purchased particular medical supplies or when no unrestricted bidder had made a "comparable low bid or offer." I d. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § § 22H(b), 22!, 22H(d) (West 1996 19 Zschernig held that a state law intrudes into foreign affairs regulation when it has more than "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries" or a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment." 20 The existence of a foreign affairs purpose 21 underlying a state law is often strong evidence of an unacceptable effect on foreign affairs. Consequently, the case law since Zschernig has distinguished between laws with and without a foreign affairs purpose. 22 Because the Burma Law had a facial foreign affairs purpose 23 and the 17 Consequently, "it will be largely for the courts ..
• to develop the distinctions and draw the lines that will define the Zschemig limitations on the states." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 (1996) [Vol. I12:2013 effects of the law were indeterminate, this Comment focuses on those cases that involve state acts with a foreign affairs purpose and ambiguous effects.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
These cases illustrate two different and inconsistent approaches for applying the Zschernig effects test: formulating the effects inquiry at either a high or low level of generality. Inquiries at a high level of generality examine any potential effects that the statute could have on U.S. foreign relations. The mere intention of a state to affect a foreign country's domestic policies, when examined from a high level of generality, would be seen as potentially affecting foreign affairs because of the possibility that a foreign country could react to a state's commentary. Alternatively, when framing the effects question at a low level of generality, courts focus on the actual effects a statute has on a foreign country. It is this inconsistency of interpretive approach that Chief Judge Tauro failed to address in National Foreign Trade Council, thus maintaining the confusion regarding state involvement in foreign affairs.
The level of generality that the court applies to its effects inquiry is particularly important because the validity of a statute turns on the finding of foreign affairs effects as defined by Zschernig. If courts were to examine state laws or other legal acts at a high level of generality, all acts that have a facial foreign affairs purpose could be found invalid. Alternatively, if the effects inquiry is at a low level of generality, it will be significantly more difficult to find that state legal acts actually or potentially affect foreign affairs.
The cases examined below involve laws or state actions that have a clear foreign affairs purpose; a desire to note disapproval of a foreign country's domestic policy motivated each of the laws or state actions. Some of the cases implicitly suggest that once a foreign affairs purpose is identified, a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment of United States foreign policy" 24 is automatic. Alternatively, another case requires a direct showing of effect within a foreign country. 25 Courts have generally examined the Zschernig effects inquiry at a high level of generality and have consequently found the state action in Alternatively, one court has applied the eff!!cts inquiry at a low level of generality. In Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 35 a Baltimore city ordinance required the city to divest all funds invested in "banks or fmancial institutions that make loans to South Africa or Namibia or companies 'doing business in or with' those countries." 36 The court examined the effects of the Baltimore ordinance 37 at a particularly low level of generality, looking to the specific effects that the divestment would have in South Africa. The court found that divestment "has no immediate effect on foreign relations between South Africa and the United States" and "that divestment alone would not cause companies to leave South Africa and that the divestment move- Once a court has determined that a law, commission ruling, or ordinance has a foreign affairs purpose, framing the Zschernig effects inquiry at a high level of generality makes it nearly impossible to find that the act does not affect foreign relations. When investigating at a low level of generality, however, courts will be less likely to find unconstitutionality. High level of generality inquiries are normatively better in this context because they better protect the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs. The United States of America operates in the international community as one nation. The Constitution supports this strategy by granting the federal government the exclusive authority to make treaties and regulate foreign commerce. 40 Decisions regarding relationships with other nations must be made with the interest of the United States as a whole in mind and federal control over this process best facilitates that goal. Given increasing globalization, however, international issues are becoming more important at the local level. While finding better ways to infuse local voices into the creation of the national foreign affairs agenda is important, increased local interest does not justify allowing states to make and enforce their own foreign affairs agendas.
Although Chief Judge Tauro relied on the Zschernig test and correctly decided the case, he did not clarify the manner in which the test was applied. The opinion merely noted that the Burma Law commented on the domestic policy of Myanmar and that the European Union and Association of South East Asian Nations voiced their opposition to the law in the World Trade Organization.41 However, at no point in the opinion did the court clarify that the constitutional status of the Burma Law hinged on either of these findings. By failing to articulate the level of generality at which he applied the Zschernig effects test, Chief Judge Tauro simply added another imprecise decision to an already confusing jurisprudence addressing state actions and federal foreign affairs power. 
